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The
Principle of Movement in the Structure of Islam
As a cultural
movement Islam rejects the old static view of the universe, and reaches a dynamic
view. As an emotional system of unification it recognizes the worth of the individual
as such, and rejects blood-relationship as a basis of human unity. Blood-relationship
is earth-rootedness. The search for a purely psychological foundation of human
unity becomes possible only with the perception that all human life is spiritual
in its origin.1 Such a perception is creative of fresh loyalties
without any ceremonial to keep them alive, and makes it possible for man to
emancipate himself from the earth. Christianity which had originally appeared
as a monastic order was tried by Constantine as a system of unification.2
Its failure to work as such a system drove the Emperor Julian3 to
return to the old gods of Rome on which he attempted to put philosophical interpretations.
A modern historian of civilization has thus depicted the state of the civilized
world about the time when Islam appeared on the stage of History:
It seemed
then that the great civilization that it had taken four thousand years to construct
was on the verge of disintegration, and that mankind was likely to return to
that condition of barbarism where every tribe and sect was against the next,
and law and order were unknown . . . The old tribal sanctions had lost their
power. Hence the old imperial methods would no longer operate. The new sanctions
created by Christianity were working division and destruction instead of unity
and order. It was a time fraught with tragedy. Civilization, like a gigantic
tree whose foliage had overarched the world and whose branches had borne the
golden fruits of art and science and literature, stood tottering, its trunk
no longer alive with the flowing sap of devotion and reverence, but rotted to
the core, riven by the storms of war, and held together only by the cords of
ancient customs and laws, that might snap at any moment. Was there any emotional
culture that could be brought in, to gather mankind once more into unity and
to save civilization? This culture must be something of a new type, for the
old sanctions and ceremonials were dead, and to build up others of the same
kind would be the work of centuries.’4
The writer
then proceeds to tell us that the world stood in need of a new culture to take
the place of the culture of the throne, and the systems of unification which
were based on blood-relationship. It is amazing, he adds, that such a culture
should have arisen from Arabia just at the time when it was most needed. There
is, however, nothing amazing in the phenomenon. The world-life intuitively sees
its own needs, and at critical moments defines its own direction. This is what,
in the language of religion, we call prophetic revelation. It is only natural
that Islam should have flashed across the consciousness of a simple people untouched
by any of the ancient cultures, and occupying a geographical position where
three continents meet together. The new culture finds the foundation of world-unity
in the principle of Tauhâd.’5 Islam, as a polity, is only a
practical means of making this principle a living factor in the intellectual
and emotional life of mankind. It demands loyalty to God, not to thrones. And
since God is the ultimate spiritual basis of all life, loyalty to God virtually
amounts to man’s loyalty to his own ideal nature. The ultimate spiritual
basis of all life, as conceived by Islam, is eternal and reveals itself in variety
and change. A society based on such a conception of Reality must reconcile,
in its life, the categories of permanence and change. It must possess eternal
principles to regulate its collective life, for the eternal gives us a foothold
in the world of perpetual change. But eternal principles when they are understood
to exclude all possibilities of change which, according to the Qur’«n,
is one of the greatest ‘signs’ of God, tend to immobilize what is
essentially mobile in its nature. The failure of the Europe in political and
social sciences illustrates the former principle, the immobility of Islam during
the last five hundred years illustrates the latter. What then is the principle
of movement in the structure of Islam? This is known as Ijtih«d.
The word
literally means to exert. In the terminology of Islamic law it means to exert
with a view to form an independent judgement on a legal question. The idea,
I believe, has its origin in a well-known verse of the Qur’«n - ‘And
to those who exert We show Our path’.6 We find it more definitely
adumbrated in a tradition of the Holy Prophet. When Mu‘«dh was appointed
ruler of Yemen, the Prophet is reported to have asked him as to how he would
decide matters coming up before him. ‘I will judge matters according to
the Book of God,’ said Mu‘«dh. ‘But if the Book of God contains
nothing to guide you?’ ‘Then I will act on the precedents of the Prophet
of God.’ ‘But if the precedents fail?’ ‘Then I will exert
to form my own judgement.’7 The student of the history of Islam,
however, is well aware that with the political expansion of Islam systematic
legal thought became an absolute necessity, and our early doctors of law, both
of Arabian and non-Arabian descent, worked ceaselessly until all the accumulated
wealth of legal thought found a final expression in our recognized schools of
Law. These schools of Law recognize three degrees of Ijtih«d: (1) complete
authority in legislation which is practically confined to be founders of the
schools, (2) relative authority which is to be exercised within the limits of
a particular school, and (3) special authority which relates to the determining
of the law applicable to a particular case left undetermined by the founders.8
In this paper I am concerned with the first degree of Ijtih«d only, i.e.
complete authority in legislation. The theoretical possibility of this degree
of Ijtih«d is admitted by the Sunni`s, but in practice it has always
been denied ever since the establishment of the schools, inasmuch as the idea
of complete Ijtih«d is hedged round by conditions which are well-nigh
impossible of realization in a single individual. Such an attitude seems exceedingly
strange in a system of law based mainly on the groundwork provided by the Qur’«n
which embodies an essentially dynamic outlook on life. It is, therefore, necessary,
before we proceed farther, to discover the cause of this intellectual attitude
which has reduced the Law of Islam practically to a state of immobility. Some
European writers think that the stationary character of the Law of Islam is
due to the influence of the Turks. This is an entirely superficial view, for
the legal schools of Islam had been finally established long before the Turkish
influence began to work in the history of Islam. The real causes are, in my
opinion, as follows:
1. We are
all familiar with the Rationalist movement which appeared in the church of Islam
during the early days of the Abbasids and the bitter controversies which it
raised. Take for instance the one important point of controversy between the
two camps - the conservative dogma of the eternity of the Qur’«n. The Rationalists
denied it because they thought that this was only another form of the Christian
dogma of the eternity of the word; on the other hand, the conservative thinkers
whom the later Abbasids, fearing the political implications of Rationalism,
gave their full support, thought that by denying the eternity of the Qur’«n
the Rationalists were undermining the very foundations of Muslim society.9
Naïï«m, for instance, practically rejected the traditions, and openly declared
Abë Hurairah to be an untrustworthy reporter.10 Thus, partly owing
to a misunderstanding of the ultimate motives of Rationalism, and partly owing
to the unrestrained thought of particular Rationalists, conservative thinkers
regarded this movement as a force of disintegration, and considered it a danger
to the stability of Islam as a social polity.11 Their main purpose,
therefore, was to preserve the social integrity of Islam, and to realize this
the only course open to them was to utilize the binding force of Sharâ‘ah,
and to make the structure of their legal system as rigorous as possible.
2. The rise
and growth of ascetic Sufism, which gradually developed under influences of
a non-Islamic character, a purely speculative side, is to a large extent responsible
for this attitude. On its purely religious side Sufism fostered a kind of revolt
against the verbal quibbles of our early doctors. The case of Sufy«n Thaurâ
is an instance in point. He was one of the acutest legal minds of his time,
and was nearly the founder of a school of law,12 but being also intensely
spiritual, the dry-as-dust subtleties of contemporary legists drove him to ascetic
Sufism. On its speculative side which developed later, Sufism is a form of freethought
and in alliance with Rationalism. The emphasis that it laid on the distinction
of ï«hir and b«Çin (Appearance and Reality) created an attitude
of indifference to all that applies to Appearance and not to Reality.13
This spirit
of total other-wordliness in later Sufism obscured men’s vision of a very
important aspect of Islam as a social polity, and, offering the prospect of
unrestrained thought on its speculative side, it attracted and finally absorbed
the best minds in Islam. The Muslim state was thus left generally in the hands
of intellectual mediocrities, and the unthinking masses of Islam, having no
personalities of a higher calibre to guide them, found their security only in
blindly following the schools.
3. On the
top of all this came the destruction of Baghdad - the centre of Muslim intellectual
life - in the middle of the thirteenth century. This was indeed a great blow,
and all the contemporary historians of the invasion of Tartars describe the
havoc of Baghdad with a half-suppressed pessimism about the future of Islam.
For fear of further disintegration, which is only natural in such a period of
political decay, the conservative thinkers of Islam focused all their efforts
on the one point of preserving a uniform social life for the people by a jealous
exclusion of all innovations in the law of Sharâ‘ah as expounded by the
early doctors of Islam. Their leading idea was social order, and there is no
doubt that they were partly right, because organization does to a certain extent
counteract the forces of decay. But they did not see, and our modern ‘Ulem«
do not see, that the ultimate fate of a people does not depend so much on organization
as on the worth and power of individual men. In an over-organized society the
individual is altogether crushed out of existence. He gains the whole wealth
of social thought around him and loses his own soul. Thus a false reverence
for past history and its artificial resurrection constitute no remedy for a
people’s decay. ‘The verdict of history’, as a modern writer
has happily put it, ‘is that worn-out ideas have never risen to power among
a people who have worn them out.’ The only effective power, therefore,
that counteracts the forces of decay in a people is the rearing of self-concentrated
individuals. Such individuals alone reveal the depth of life. They disclose
new standards in the light of which we begin to see that our environment is
not wholly inviolable and requires revision. The tendency to over-organization
by a false reverence of the past, as manifested in the legists of Islam in the
thirteenth century and later, was contrary to the inner impulse of Islam, and
consequently invoked the powerful reaction of Ibn Taimâyyah, one of the most
indefatigable writers and preachers of Islam, who was born in 1263, five years
after the destruction of Baghdad.
Ibn Taimâyyah
was brought up in Hanbalite tradition. Claiming freedom of Ijtih«d for
himself he rose in revolt against the finality of the schools, and went back
to first principles in order to make a fresh start. Like Ibn Àazm - the founder
of Ê«hirâschool of law14 - he rejected the Hanafite principle of
reasoning by analogy and Ijm«’ as understood by older legists;15
for he thought agreement was the basis of all superstition.16 And
there is no doubt that, considering the moral and intellectual decrepitude of
his times, he was right in doing so. In the sixteenth century Suyëtâ claimed
the same privilege of Ijtih«d to which he added the idea of a renovator
at the beginning of each century.17 But the spirit of Ibn Taimâyyah’s
teaching found a fuller expression in a movement of immense potentialities which
arose in the eighteenth century, from the sands of Nejd, described by Macdonald
as the ‘cleanest spot in the decadent world of Islam’. It is really
the first throb of life in modern Islam. To the inspiration of this movement
are traceable, directly or indirectly, nearly all the great modern movements
of Muslim Asia and Africa, e.g. the Sanâsâ movement, the Pan-Islamic movement,18
and the B«bâ movement, which is only a Persian reflex of Arabian Protestantism.
The great puritan reformer, Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahh«h, who was born in
1700,19 studied in Medina, travelled in Persia, and finally succeeded
in spreading the fire of his restless soul throughout the whole world of Islam.
He was similar in spirit to Ghazz«lâ’s disciple, Muhammad Ibn Tëmart20
- the Berber puritan reformer of Islam who appeared amidst the decay of Muslim
Spain, and gave her a fresh inspiration. We are, however, not concerned with
the political career of this movement which was terminated by the armies of
Muhammad ‘Alâ P«sh«. The essential thing to note is the spirit of freedom
manifested in it, though inwardly this movement, too, is conservative in its
own fashion. While it rises in revolt against the finality of the schools, and
vigorously asserts the right of private judgement, its vision of the past is
wholly uncritical, and in matters of law it mainly falls back on the traditions
of the Prophet.
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[See
Notes]
Date/Time Last Modified: 6/18/2002 8:03:40 AM
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